Abuja, Nigeria — Former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Lucky Irabor (rtd), says the Boko Haram insurgency should never be framed as a religious war but as a campaign of “evil” waged by fanatics who cloaked terror in the language of faith.
In Chapter 7 of his newly released book, SCARS: Nigeria’s Journey and the Boko Haram Conundrum, Irabor writes that the group’s rhetoric of “religious puritanism” masked atrocities inflicted on both Muslims and Christians across Nigeria.
“Nigerians and the international community must understand that Boko Haram were purveyors of anguish and torment under the cloak of religious puritanism,” he says. “From the onset, their intention was not to defend faith but to unleash mass killings, abductions, and destruction on the populace.”
Irabor argues Boko Haram sought spectacle and maximum disruption, citing April 2014 as a pivotal moment when the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok was synchronized with a bombing at Abuja’s Nyanya Bus Station to stretch and distract security agencies.
“The abduction of the Chibok girls came on the same day as the Nyanya Bus Station bomb blast… It thus provided Boko Haram some advantage of freedom of action on the night of the abduction,” he writes.
Rejecting conspiracy theories, Irabor recounts visiting Chibok two days after the raid and witnessing the devastation: “The abduction… did happen. Suggestions that it was staged are baseless and unhelpful… It remains one of the darkest moments of our national history.” The kidnapping sparked the global #BringBackOurGirls movement and, he says, exposed gaps in intelligence coordination and rapid response at the time.
The retired general details other mass-casualty attacks attributed to the group, including the February 2014 massacre at Federal Government College, Buni Yadi, where 59 boys were killed in their sleep.
“Those boys were burnt alive in their hostels… a most cruel, devilish act that demonstrated Boko Haram’s hatred for education and progress,” he laments, noting the group’s mantra that Western education is forbidden.
Irabor catalogues bombings and assaults in Jos, Potiskum, Madalla and Abuja—among them the attacks on the UN headquarters and Nigeria Police Force Headquarters—that left scores dead and hundreds injured. He says targets were often chosen to provoke sectarian backlash:
“Their attacks were intended to provoke religious conflict by targeting churches and mosques to inflame tensions between Christians and Muslims,” he writes, crediting swift interventions by government and religious leaders with averting a broader sectarian war.
Beyond civilian casualties, Irabor describes systematic destruction of critical infrastructure, arguing that Boko Haram’s strategy aimed to cripple governance, erode public confidence and derail development.
Framing the conflict as a “war of evil” rather than a clash of religions, Irabor calls for sustained investment in intelligence, inter-agency coordination and community-level early-warning systems as essential to preventing future atrocities.
SCARS blends personal accounts from Irabor’s years in command with a broader history of the insurgency, positioning the book as both a record of Nigeria’s trauma and a field guide to the hard lessons learned in confronting violent extremism.
